

Topic: Bioweapons and Chemical Weapons

Main Submitter: Russian Federation

Co-Submitters: French Republic, Federal Republic Of Germany, Republic of India, Republic of Singapore, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Signatories: The United States of America, Republic of Poland, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic of South Africa, V

The General Assembly First Committee,

Recalling its previous resolutions 71/220 (2017), 47/39 (1992) and 61/102 (2006) about the prohibition of production of chemical weapons and the safe disposal of pre-existing stockpiles,

Acknowledging the relevance of pre-existing frameworks such as the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its mandate, as it encompasses existing regimes on mitigating the proliferation of chemical weapons,

Noting the need to monitor the proliferation of biological weapons due to the unsupervised nature of its transportation across national borders as well as discrepancies between declared and undeclared stockpiles,

Recognizing the urgency of eradicating weapons of mass destruction from the modern global community as they are weapons which directly impact human rights and have dire impacts on victims,

Noting the need to monitor the proliferation of biological weapons due to the unsupervised nature of its transportation across national borders as well as discrepancies between declared and undeclared stockpiles,

Emphasizing the need for an economical and environmentally-friendly international disposal mechanism for the remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons,

Deeply concerned by the unpredictability and inherent danger of such weapons, especially since they usually damage their surroundings and spread beyond their targets,

1. Urges nations to provide humanitarian aid and shelter to victims of chemical and biological warfare by means such as but not limited to:
 - a. Work opportunities can be provided to those fit for employment;
 - b. Rehabilitation and reintegration services back into society;
 - c. Relocation in the event of uninhabitable conditions caused in and/or due to the possible event of an attack;

2. Recommends working with the OPCW and Member States to create international chemical weapon disposal mechanism by:
 - a. Reusing the components of chemical weapons for research and promoting the funding of laboratories, so chemical weapons stockpiles can be used by scientists for alternative purposes, as well as, neutralizing the remaining components;
 - b. Emphasizing a neutralization method followed by biotreatment as an environmentally friendly, relatively simple, and cost-effective method to dispose of chemical weapons;
 - c. Verifying the destruction of chemical weapons by OPCW officers and the recording of the verification into an international chemical weapons database;
 - d. Suggesting funding from Member States to be allocated towards the international chemical weapons disposal mechanism;

3. Further recommends a closer cooperation with the chemical industries which will be of use for conducting research and development on dual-use chemicals for the purposes of:
 - a. Efficient communication between Member States and chemical industries for effective dissemination of information new chemicals which can be used for beneficial and harmful purposes;
 - b. Sharing of information of effective ways of disposing chemicals that could prevent detrimental effects on the environment;

4. Suggests that in the case of a chemical attack, citizens are recommended to be knowledgeable about how to respond and protect themselves and established toolkits that help bring attention to the victims of chemical warfare, assist investigators with establishing target areas and educate others in what to do in case of a chemical attack, which can be done by means such as but not limited to:
 - a. Social media, such as videos and posts, which can be used to disseminate UN-sponsored post that include relevant medical techniques to make civilians under potential attack aware of the dangers of chemical weapons and how to best respond to them through proper self-care and maintenance after the attack, through proper knowledge of where to acquire treatment for the effects of chemical weapons, by understanding not all illnesses and long-term disabilities from chemical weapons are visual and to still find help if a victim seems unaffected;
 - b. The development and execution of chemical weapon attack drills, which may better civilian understanding of how to remain safe during a chemical weapons attack through response simulation of these attacks, better the understanding of first responders on how to adequately address the issue and remain safe during and after the attack, and promote healthy tactics for local leaders on how to boost the morale of citizens' post-attack, assess the damage, and plan moving forward;
 - c. Incorporation into formal education, through specific-educational programs, the hazards of chemical weapons can be removed by encouraging the Member States

to incorporate the work of NGOs such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent into formal education;

- d. Implementing measures to educate potential victims of attacks using chemical and biological weapons on the proper response in the event of chemical and biological weapons to attack pertinent to individuals including but not limited to:
 - i. Political refugees;
 - ii. Ethnic minorities;
 - iii. People in regions of conflict;
5. Calls upon Member States to leverage their capabilities to address threats posed by chemical terrorism and to promote the peaceful use of chemicals by:
- a. Increasing cooperation and responsibility of the chemical industry and national authorities through suggesting comprehensive dialogues regarding chemical substances, quantities, safeguarding measures, chain of custody, and so forth; in order to ensure accountability of materials;
 - b. Promoting cross-border cooperation and collaboration of national authority agencies for the purposes of consensus-building and collaboration directed at regional trade and accountability for materials so that they are not lost in the route between borders;
 - c. Encourages member states to collaborate and share intelligence with authorities in order to prevent the research, manufacturing, stockpiling and use of such weapons;

6. Recommends increased dialogue between national authorities, corporations, and international entities by:
 - a. Establishing an annual summit overseen by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) comprising of scientists and industry professionals to investigate potential universal security flaws, risks, and solutions;
 - b. Offering critical resources to communities under threat of chemical warfare attacks to minimize the damage inflicted;
 - c. Providing training to law enforcement officials through existing INTERPOL projects;
 - d. Expanding the working group as established in General Assembly resolution 70/33 (2015) to offer avenues for dialogue between all Member States to find collaborative solutions;

7. Urges other Member States to create an international bioweapons reductions treaty modelled after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which would contain:
 - a. Designated reduction goals for bioweapons;
 - b. A time period for implementing these reduction goals;
 - c. The duration for which this treaty would be effective;
 - d. A strong verification system to ensure the elimination of the designated items;

- e. Notification guidelines for the time period that other parties must be notified before certain actions, particularly withdrawal from the treaty;
 - f. Mandatory reporting of biological and chemical research conducted so as to establish a system of accountability and vigilance;
 - g. Violation of this treaty should result in repercussions in the form of, but not limited to economic sanctions;
8. Recommends that Member States need to take and strengthen national measures as appropriate, to ensure that chemical and biological weapons do not fall into the hands of malicious terrorist organizations by:
- a. Establishing an effective chemical security infrastructure requiring a multidisciplinary approach by:
 - i. Training forces in the regions including basic training and more training from state systems to safely extract stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons;
 - ii. Specifying threat levels and increasing the amount of overwatch as well as available intel, relevant to chemical weapons;
 - iii. Establishing security protocol and measures in compliance with the international legal framework;
 - iv. Taking recommendations from OPCW inspectors in regard to how secure the facilities are;

- v. Increased security of chemical facilities through background checks on facility workers, and ensuring that entrance be granted to only approved workers.